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1 Introduction 
 
Lucy the scientist starts wondering about how to account for a given biological phenomenon 
F within cell theory. So, the question Lucy is after can be simply put as follows: How to 
explain F? Call this question FQ. Lucy has never worked on F, nor has she ever talked about 
F with her colleagues or heard anything about how others try to explain it. She is therefore 
genuinely open-minded about how to answer FQ. Lucy starts investigating into F by being 
neutral as to what the best explanation of F is, and she pursues her inquiry by applying usual 
standards and methods of scientific research. 
The first thing Lucy does is trying to acquire more information about F. By doing so, 
she quickly realises that the available information is such that there are three possible 
candidate explanations for F: call them pf, rf, and vf. At some point in her inquiry, Lucy begins 
to think that pf is the best shot at explaining F. That is to say, she starts being more inclined 
towards pf than towards rf and vf. Her inclination is cognitive and inquiry-directed, that is, she 
starts assigning pf some inquisitive priority over rf, and vf. However, Lucy notices that the 
probative force of all the evidence she has collected needs to be assessed more thoroughly 
than she has so far done in order to establish whether that evidence will indeed favour pf over 
rf and vf. Moreover, the coherence of pf with other well-established biological truths has yet to 
be checked. So, Lucy is very well aware that the situation is still epistemically equivocal. 
Thus, even if Lucy takes pf  to be the best way of answering FQ, she is not yet ready to 
unqualifiedly say something like: ‘pf   explains F’. Rather, she is disposed to check whether pf 
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coheres with well-established biological truths,1 to explain away the recalcitrant piece of data 
allegedly speaking against pf  being the explanation of F, to set up new experiments by 
checking pf first and the other candidate answers later, and so on and so forth. 
I submit that the most natural way to describe Lucy’s inquisitive scenario is the 
following: Lucy is not yet ready to close her inquiry into FQ via pf. So, she takes her inquiry 
into FQ to be still open. But she is no longer doxastically neutral about FQ either. Lucy’s 
case, in my opinion, warrants exploration of the idea that some of our inquisitive enterprises 
are best understood via a three-stage model of inquiry: 
 
Three-stage model of inquiry 
1. One is open-minded about how to answer the question Q. 
2.    One is inclined to answer Q in a given way while taking the question to be still open. 
3.    One closes Q. 
 
The idea of there to be separate stages of inquiry has not gone unnoticed in contemporary 
philosophy. Several philosophers working on the nature and texture of scientific discovery 
have acknowledged the existence of a stage of inquiry at which scientists develop their 
theories after having formulated them and before taking them to be well-established accounts 
of certain phenomena. Among them, Laudan (1978) expands on N.R. Hanson’s work on 
abduction (see Hanson 1958) by identifying a middle phase between formulation and 
acceptance of a theory that he dubs “context of pursuit”. Laudan’s approach, as well as the 
																																																								
1Clearly, Lucy could also focus on rf or vf if doing so would enable her to rule those explanations out by 
employing less resources. Yet, this point is orthogonal to the inquisitive priority that pf holds in Lucy’s mind. I 
owe this point to an anonymous referee. 
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body of literature it has generated,2 revolves around the existence of different “contexts of 
inquiry”. In this paper, I approach the question of the structure of inquiry from a different and 
underexplored perspective by investigating the nature of the mental state(s) we are in when 
we inquire into some matter. More specifically, my aim is to bring out the functional and 
normative features of the attitude of cognitive inclination towards a given answer to a 
question we have the second stage of what I have called three-stage inquiries.3 As I see it, this 
question arises irrespective of whether or not the inquiry we are pursuing deserves to be 
qualified as scientific. 4 Lucy’s predicament is, I take it, a familiar one. We, qua laypersons, 
very often find ourselves in situations where we are inclined towards answering a question in 
a given way without ipso facto taking the question to be settled. Suppose I am trying to find a 
paper about normative requirements I only vaguely recall. I might clearly be inclined towards 
taking this paper to be authored by John Broome and to have “normative” in the title. I then 
start inquiring into this accordingly (e.g. by google searching “John Broome and normative” 
instead of “Nico Kolodny and normative”, for instance).5 Clearly, I am inclined towards the 
proposition that John Broome is the author of the paper qua answer to the question of who 
the author of the paper I am looking for is, but I do not yet take my inquiry into this question 
to be settled.  Hence, even if I will use Lucy’s case as a foil throughout, my considerations are 
meant to carry over to all the inquiries exhibiting the three-stage structure schematically 
outlined above. 																																																								
2 See e.g. McKaughan (2008) and Whitt (1990) for different overviews of the literature on scientific pursuit-
worthiness. 
3 As far as I am aware, the only notable exception is a recent article by Will Fleisher (2018) with which I will 
engage at various points of the present investigation. 
4 To forestall misunderstandings: The role of Lucy’s case is not to offer a faithful reconstruction of scientific 
practice but rather to illustrate the possibility of three-stage inquiries by giving it some concreteness. 
5 I would like to thank Tim Schroeder for suggesting this nice example to me. 
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Before getting into the main discussion, let me also clarify that I am not claiming that 
inquiry usually is a three-stage process, nor am I suggesting that certain inquiries necessarily 
obey the three-stage model. Lucy’s case is meant to show that at least some of our inquisitive 
enterprises intuitively fall under the three-stage model.  Since the main aim of this paper is to 
examine the nature of the mental state we are in when we are cognitively inclined towards a 
given answer to a question, the issue of whether there are types of inquiry that in principle 
couldn’t be conducted in a two- or three-stage way will have to be deferred to further works. 
That being said, the plan for the paper is as follows. In section 2 I argue that a proper 
account of the second stage of a three-stage inquiry requires specifying a functionally 
distinctive type of doxastic attitude that I shall call, for labelling purposes, “hypothesis”. In 
section 3 I unpack the distinctive normative profile of hypothesis. The discussion in sections 
2-3 is conducted by contrasting hypothesis with more familiar doxastic attitudes, such as 
suspended judgement and full belief. In section 4 I claim that hypothesis is a sui generis 
doxastic attitude, that is, it does not reduce to credences or metacognitive states of mind, such 
as a belief about the epistemic status of a given proposition. In section 5 I sketch out the 
epistemological significance of the attitude of hypothesis. 
 
2 Stages of open inquiry: functional differences and their consequences 
 
To get a grip on what the difference between the first and the second stage of open inquiry is I 
will avail myself of some remarks offered by Jane Friedman (2017, forthcoming), whose 
views about inquiry and the doxastic attitudes will provide helpful foils against which to 
conduct the present investigation. 
Friedman (2017: 303-4) maintains that when one is in an inquiring state of mind, one 
aims to resolve or answer the question at issue. This comes with (2017: 308) “a sort of 
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orientation towards or sensitivity to information that bears on the focal question, and perhaps 
some other related sorts of dispositions to come to know things that will help one close that 
question”. This strikes me as correct, but how does it translate into inquiries such as Lucy’s? 
I submit that at the first stage the inquirer starts collecting evidence and information 
while being completely open to the possibility that various candidate answers are equally 
good answers to the question, whereas at the second stage the inquirer puts one of these 
candidate answers first with the aim of assessing it more carefully against the collected data. 
So, at the second stage, the inquirer keeps on being sensitive to the information that bears on 
the question. Yet, she is sensitive to it in a specific way. For instance, she focuses on whether 
the information she has collected supports closing the question through a specific answer 
amongst the available candidates. Or else, she makes sure that the answer she is cognitively 
inclined towards coheres with other relevant well-established truths and general principles. To 
illustrate these rather abstract claims, let us take Lucy’s case. We can easily envisage that 
whenever a new F-related experiment can be conducted and there’s a variable within the 
experiment having to do with the kind of predictions to expect conditional upon a given 
explanation of F, Lucy is disposed to start the experiment by taking pf first and use it as the 
relevant value for the variable. Moreover, if she came across to a piece of recalcitrant 
evidence which seems to undermine pf, she would be disposed to see whether such new 
evidence can be explained away rather than immediately taking it at face value. Plausibly, 
Lucy would also be disposed to check whether pf does cohere with more general and well-
established biological principles. 
This gives us a first pass characterisation of the differences between what one is 
disposed to do at the first stage and at the second stage of an open inquiry. What do these 
observations tell us about the type(s) of attitude we entertain while inquiring into some 
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matter? More specifically: what do they tell us about the attitude of cognitive inclination one 
holds at the second stage of inquiry? 
 
2.1 The Suspended Judgement Answer 
 
Friedman offers an indirect answer to the previous question by defending the following 
biconditional (Friedman 2017: 302): 
 
(BICON) 
Necessarily: One is in an inquiring state mind about some matter if, and only if, one is 
suspended about that matter. 
 
By proposing (BICON), Friedman expands on the traditional insight – which can be traced 
back to the works of Descartes and Sextus Empiricus – of there to be a close connection 
between inquiry and suspended judgement. Suspended judgement, on Friedman’s view (2017: 
303-4), is a doxastic attitude standing for a committed state of epistemic neutrality or 
indecision whose content is a question.6 Questions are abstract objects which differ from 
propositions in that the latter are endowed with (or simply are) truth-conditions, whereas the 
																																																								
6 A clarification is in order here. I will keep on endorsing Friedman’s characterisation of suspended judgement 
for the sake of simplicity, but let emphasise that the correctness of the view I will put forward does not rely on 
the correctness of her account of suspended judgement. All I need in order to distinguish between the first and 
the second stage of open inquiry is the distinction between a stage at which the inquirer is epistemically neutral 
and a stage at which she no longer is. The kind of epistemic neutrality I am interested in could be equally 
delivered by other accounts of suspended judgement. 
	 7	
former are not. Questions can be seen as sets of possible answers determined by the form of 
the question, where answers are propositions.7 
Importantly, (BICON) contains an answer to the focal question of this paper: since 
being in an inquiring state of mind towards a given matter just is being suspended about it, 
and since one is in such an inquiring state of mind at both stages of open inquiry, it follows 
that one just is suspended at both stages of open inquiry. Call this the Suspended Judgement 
Answer. 
I agree with the right-to-left side of (BICON): being suspended about a question is a 
doxastic hallmark of open inquiry. Yet, I disagree with its left-to-right side. That is to say, I 
believe that the Suspended Judgement Answer is incorrect. To see why, notice that in order 
for the Suspended Judgement Answer to succeed, such an answer has to take proper account 
of the fact that the inquirer is disposed to make different inquisitive moves at different stages 
of open inquiry. To do so, one might maintain that at both stages the inquirer is suspended and 
that the focal question she is suspended about changes from stage to stage. For instance, one 
can make sense of Lucy’s changing stages of inquiry by saying that while at the first stage she 
is suspended about FQ, at the second stage she is suspended about whether pf is well 
supported by the available evidence. 
However, closer inspection reveals that this proposal runs into what I will call the Unity 
of Inquiry Problem. The problem arises from the following line of reasoning. The left-to-right 
side of (BICON) tells us that if one inquiries into some matter M, then one is suspended about 
Q. Now, if we accept the idea that at different stages of inquiry one is not suspended about the 																																																								
7 For more details about questions and answers, see Friedman (2013). Let me just draw the reader’s attention to 
an important distinction between answers and responses to a question pointed out in Friedman (2013). If we are 
inquiring into the question of whether Matthew made it to the party, this question has two possible answers 
only: either he made it, or he did not. However, one can respond to this question by saying “Who’s Matthew?”, 
“Which Party?”, and so on. I am here interested in answers and not in responses. 
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same Q, we have that, at the second stage, one is not suspended about Q. It follows that at the 
second stage of inquiry one is not inquiring into M. I want now to show that this reasoning 
leads to an unwelcome conclusion. 
Let us reflect on Lucy’s case. Lucy is inquiring into how to explain F. Recall that FQ is 
the question she is after. The fact that, at the second stage, Lucy shifts the focus of her inquiry 
onto a given way of answering FQ in no way undermines the fact that she is still inquiring 
into the same matter, viz. how to best explain F. That is to say, it seems plausible to classify 
the two stages at which the inquiry is open as being stages of the same inquiry, i.e. an inquiry 
into how to best explain F. Thus, it is reasonable to ask of any account of the attitude Lucy 
has at the second stage of her inquiry that it keep track of the fact that Lucy has been inquiring 
into the same matter all along. Thus, since at the second stage Lucy is still inquiring into FQ, 
FQ must somehow figure in the specification of her state of mind. And yet, if we accepted the 
claim that at the second stage Lucy is inquiring into a different question than FQ, we would 
not be able to say that Lucy is inquiring into the same matter at both the first and the second 
stage of her inquiry. This follows from the claim that inquiring into M entails being 
suspended about Q and the idea that one is suspended about different questions at different 
stages of the inquiry. Thus, if we accepted the idea that one holds an attitude of suspended 
judgement at both at the first and the second stage of the inquiry, we would not be able to 
capture the unity of subject-matter of the inquiry one is pursuing, for the content of the 
inquiring state of mind would change across stages and there is no other way to specify which 
M is at stake. This is the Unity of Inquiry Problem. 
To forestall misunderstandings: The Unity of Inquiry Problem does not trade upon the 
idea that suspending judgement about Q and being cognitively inclined towards p qua answer 
to Q are not compossible states of mind. Clearly, just like one can believe p and not-p at the 
same time, one can suspend judgement about Q while taking p to be the best shot at 
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answering Q. The Unity of Inquiry Problem is best seen as one of the two horns of a dilemma. 
The dilemma starts from assuming the Suspended Judgement Answer to the effect that 
suspended judgement is the only type of doxastic attitude that one tokens when one is 
inquiring into a question. If we maintain this, either we have to deny the existence of three-
stage inquiries – in that, given that suspended judgement is a doxastic attitude of epistemic 
neutrality, we would have to maintain that at the second stage of inquiry Lucy is still merely 
doxastically neutral about how to explain F – or we have to face the Unity of Inquiry 
Problem. Since I take both horns to be unacceptable, I conclude that we had better not take the 
attitude of cognitive inclination one has at the second stage of inquiry to entail (or be reduced 
to) suspended judgement. This, however, in no way entails that Lucy cannot, in a 
psychological sense, be suspended about other questions, such as the question of whether an 
alternative answer to FQ, say rf, is true while, at the same time being cognitively inclined 
towards a given proposition. 
I have argued that one does not merely hold an attitude of suspended judgement towards 
a question when one is inquiring into some matter. Being epistemically neutral towards a 
question and having a cognitive inclination towards a given proposition qua answer to that 
question are to be seen as the doxastic hallmarks of, respectively, the first and second stage of 
open inquiry. 
 
2.2 The Belief Answer 
 
In this section I assess the prospects for the idea that the cognitive inclination towards pf 
manifested by Lucy at the second stage of her inquiry entails believing pf. If you agree with 
my description of Lucy’s case, this suggestion should immediately strike you as ill grounded. 
Yet, it is instructive to see what’s wrong with it in some detail. 
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To begin with, let us bear in mind that it has been long acknowledged (see e.g. 
Stalnaker 1984, Shah and Velleman 2005) that there exist different types of cognitive 
propositional attitudes. Beyond belief, we talk of ‘supposition’, ‘imagination’, ‘assumption’, 
and so on. Each of these attitudes carves out a specific way of treating a proposition as true. 
The very idea of treating a proposition as true is meant to be neutral across all these varieties, 
and it has to be understood minimally as entertaining p cognitively, or putting p before one’s 
mind when one’s mind is directed towards the world. So, these attitudes differ in their 
cognitive mode, as it were, even if they can have the same content. It is also often claimed that 
cognitive propositional attitudes are those cognitions which, metaphorically speaking, aim at 
truth (see Shah and Velleman 2005). However, different attitudes aim at truth in different 
ways. More specifically, when we say that belief aims at truth we can substantiate this 
metaphor in broadly functionalist terms by saying that belief is the type of attitude whose 
function in our mental economy is to be true. Thus, the cognitive mechanisms responsible for 
the regulation of belief work in such a way as to make belief perform its function. We can 
therefore reformulate the aim metaphor for belief as follows: 
 
(B-AIM) 
One believes that p only if one treats p as true for the sake of getting p’s truth-value right. 
 
The aim metaphor can be unpacked by focusing on two of the dispositions that are 
stereotypically associated with belief. Belief – unlike other cognitive propositional attitudes – 
involves a disposition to unqualifiedly assert p in the right circumstances and a disposition to 
use p in theoretical and practical reasoning. I turn now to argue that such two dispositions are 
not plausibly associated with the second stage of inquiry. 
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Let us take the disposition to assert p first and assume, for the sake of the argument, that 
assertion is the kind of speech act one performs when one (overtly) undertakes a commitment 
to authorise the hearer to assert p and all that logically follows from it, to take up the 
challenge of vindicating the assertion by offering considerations that justify it, and to retract it 
if certain conditions are met (See MacFarlane 2011 for a defence of this view). It seems that, 
while being at the second stage of inquiry, one is actually checking whether p is in a good 
epistemic standing, and for this reason one would not recommend others to assert p. 
Moreover, the conditions under which one ordinarily retracts one’s assertions seem unrelated 
to the second stage of inquiry. Plausibly, one commits oneself to retract one’s assertion of p if 
one knows that not-p, or if one has strong evidence against p. Yet, having strong evidence 
against the proposition one is cognitively inclined to, as well as knowing its negation, are 
epistemic statuses one reaches after having investigated further into p, and not while 
investigating into it qua answer to Q. 
The point about not being disposed to assert p when one is cognitively inclined towards 
it qua answer to Q can be made by looking at a different and highly influential approach to 
speech acts to the effect that they are type-individuated on the basis of their constitutive rules 
(see Williamson 2000). Williamson proposes that one must assert p only if one knows that p, 
whereas other authors have defended weaker truth or justification rules. Failure to comply 
with any of these rules makes the asserter vulnerable to appropriate criticism and blame. 
Suppose now that Lucy is at the second stage of inquiry and utters a bare sentence expressing 
pf while talking to her boss about where her research on F is leading her.8 In such a scenario, 
																																																								
8 I am envisaging the possibility that Lucy utters a bare sentence expressing the proposition she is cognitively 
inclined towards, but the more realistic scenario is such that she utters sentence like “pf is the best shot at 
explaining pf”, “I conjecture pf”, and so on. To my mind, this suggests that, realistically, Lucy is not disposed to 
unqualifiedly assert pf. 
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we can easily envisage both that pf is false, and that pf’s probability on Lucy’s evidence does 
not meet the threshold required for justification. If Lucy’s speech act were to be type-
individuated as an assertion, her boss could legitimately criticise Lucy’s speech act as failing 
to comply with the chosen rule, in that Lucy does not know, nor has she justification for pf. 
Yet, criticising Lucy’s representative speech act (see Searle 1976, more on this below) for 
such reasons is intuitively inappropriate. This suggests that Lucy’s speech act is not governed 
by any of the rules that have been proposed for assertion, thereby lending further support to 
the idea that one is not disposed to assert the proposition one is cognitively inclined towards 
at the second stage of inquiry. 
Let us turn now to the disposition to use p in practical and theoretical reasoning. It 
seems plausible to say that Lucy is not disposed to use pf as a premise in her theoretical and 
practical reasoning the way she is disposed to use other biological propositions she certainly 
believes, such as (say) that the cell is the fundamental unit of structure and organisation and 
in organisms, that cells contain DNA which is found specifically in the chromosome, and so 
on. To see why, suppose that different answers to FQ will have different implications for 
medical treatment of a pathology T having to do with F. If pf really is the answer to FQ, then a 
specific medical treatment for patients displaying F will be the best one to adopt, and other 
treatments will actually harm the patient. In such a case, Lucy won’t take pf as a premise in 
her reasoning about how to act regarding how to treat T. This suggests that the conditions 
under which we are disposed to rely on a proposition in practical reasoning while being at the 
second stage of inquiry are different from the ones we stereotypically associate with belief. 
In summary, I have argued that being cognitively inclined towards p qua answer to a 
given question does not entail believing p. If anything, we had better regard belief as a way – 
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arguably the most common one – of taking p to be the answer whereby to close the question 
one is inquiring into (in the affirmative).9 
 
2.3 The Hypothesis Answer 
 
In light of the arguments of sections 2.2 and 2.3, my proposal is to introduce a new type of 
doxastic attitude, which I will label “hypothesis”, to make sense of what happens cognitively 
at the second stage of inquiry.10 To put things visually: 
 
Three-stage model of inquiry 
 
1. One is open-minded about how to answer the question Q -----> One is suspended about Q. 
2. One is inclined to answer Q via p ------> One hypothesises p. 
3.  One closes Q --------> One believes p.11 
 
Since hypothesising p does not entail being suspended about some question or believing p, we 
already know what the functional profile of hypothesis does not look like. The aim of this 
section is offer a positive characterisation of it. 																																																								
9 I will come back to the issue of which doxastic attitudes are distinctively associated with the third stage of 
inquiry, i.e. namely the stage at which we close our inquiry, below. 
10 This is a mere terminological choice, and the unhappy reader should feel free to replace it with any label they 
take to be more suitable than this one. The project I am after in this paper is not to understand how we use the 
term “hypothesis” in ordinary language, but to offer a characterisation of the state of mind we are in at the 
second stage of an inquiry such as Lucy’s. 
11 Let me emphasise that this is but a simplification. I will indeed suggest that while we typically close our 
inquiries by (fully) believing a proposition, we can do so in other ways too. 
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Let us start off with an intuitive gloss on hypothesis: hypothesis is the attitude of being 
cognitively inclined towards p qua answer to a question.12 More precisely, the cognitive 
mechanisms which regulate the formation, revision and retention of hypothesis are directed 
towards an aim or function which can be put as follows: 
 
(H-AIM) 
One hypothesises that p only if one treats p as true for the sake of closing one’s inquiry into Q 
via p. 
 
It’s helpful here to contrast (H-AIM) with (B-AIM). (B-AIM) tells us that a belief that p is 
satisfied, namely it performs its function in our mental economy, only if p is true. P’s truth, 
however, is not needed in order for a hypothesis that p to perform its cognitive function. 
Moreover, (H-AIM) marks a difference in mode and content between suspended judgement 
and hypothesis. Accepting Friedman’s definition of the former, we have that suspended 
judgement is a doxastic attitude of epistemic neutrality towards a question. According to (H-
AIM), however, hypothesis is a doxastic attitude of inclination towards a proposition qua 
answer to a question. So, hypothesis is a non-neutral and propositional doxastic attitude. 
Consequently, (H-AIM) involves different dispositions from those we associate with 
suspended judgement and belief. Let me illustrate them. 
To begin with, we should identify a set of focused inquisitive dispositions, namely 
behavioural dispositions which are stereotypically associated with being inclined towards a 
proposition qua answer to a question which is still being investigated. When one hypothesises 
that p, one is disposed to make more effort in checking whether the information and evidence 																																																								
12 The reader will have by now started to wonder whether hypothesising that p reduces to (or entails) assigning a 
not-so-high credence to p. I will address this issue in section 4. 
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one has so far collected supports closing Q via p rather than doing the same checking with 
respect to other candidate answers; one is disposed to explain away recalcitrant pieces of 
evidence, as opposed to take them at face value and fall short of retaining p; one is disposed to 
make sure that p (rather than other candidate answers) coheres with other relevant well-
established Q-related truths. Notice the presence of focused inquisitive dispositions marks a 
difference between hypothesis and suspended judgement. Take for instance the disposition to 
explain away recalcitrant pieces of evidence as opposed to take them at face value. Certainly, 
this disposition is not associated with the attitude of being suspended about the question of 
whether p is true or justified: if one is epistemically neutral about whether p is true or false (or 
justified/unjustified), one is not going to explain away evidence against p’s truth. 
Let me now point towards a positive characterisation of the central verbal disposition 
we can associate with hypothesising. The comparison with belief is once again helpful, in that 
I contend that when one hypothesises that p one is disposed to conjecture, as opposed to 
assert, p. Let me explain. Since Searle (1976), it is customary to distinguish various classes of 
speech acts. For instance, we distinguish between so-called representatives (which have a 
words-to-world direction of fit) and directives (which have a world-to-words direction of fit). 
Representative speech acts, in turn, come in varieties. Searle and Vanderveken (1985: 187) 
argue that conjecturing differs from asserting and guessing. They write: “to conjecture that P 
is to weakly assert that P while presupposing that one has at least some slight evidence for P”. 
This clearly differs from asserting p, but it also differs from guessing p, in that conjecturing 
requires at least some evidence whereas guessing “can just be an unfounded stab in the dark” 
(ibid.). Turri (2010) elaborates on similar ideas by identifying a class of what he calls alethic 
speech acts, such as asserting, guessing, conjecturing, swearing, and so on. Turri proposes to 
type-individuate them by looking at the amount of credibility required of one in order for one 
to appropriately perform the relevant speech act. Plausibly, guessing requires less credibility 
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than conjecturing, conjecturing requires less credibility than asserting, swearing requires more 
credibility than asserting, and so on. Surely, more could should said about the type of speech 
act we can associate with hypothesis, but responsibility dictates to take up this question in a 
separate investigation. I nevertheless believe that the foregoing gives us enough of a grip on 
how we might characterise the central verbal disposition involved in hypothesising p. 
Moreover, as Lucy’s case shows, when one hypothesises p one is not disposed to use p 
in any kind practical and theoretical reasoning. Rather, one is disposed to rely on p both 
theoretically and practically as long as doing so is a way to inquire into a question p is taken 
to be an answer to. To illustrate this with Lucy’s case: Lucy uses pf as a premise in 
(theoretical and practical) reasoning about how to construct a new experiment about the 
biological phenomenon F she is inquiring into. So, hypothesising p involves a disposition to 
use p in inquisitive practical and theoretical reasoning, that is, in reasoning which is meant to 
establish whether p is indeed the answer to the question one is inquiring into. 
I have offered a sketch of the functional profile of hypothesis. I would like to bring out 
three noteworthy features of this sketch. First, my characterisation of the functional profile of 
hypothesis is not saddled with the Unity of Inquiry Problem. Take Lucy’s case. At the first 
stage, she is suspended about FQ. At the second stage, she hypothesises pf which, per (H-
AIM), just means that she is cognitively inclined toward pf qua answer to FQ. Since FQ 
figures in the specification of the attitudes Lucy entertains at both the first and the second 
stage of inquiry, in that FQ is the content of the attitude she holds at the first stage of her 
inquiry and FQ figures in the specification of the mode of the attitude she holds at the second 
stage, the Unity of Inquiry Problem does not arise. 
Secondly, one might notice that the characterisation of hypothesis on offer is such that it 
excludes that one hypothesises that p when one has no cognitive inclination towards p. To put 
the same point differently, my view of hypothesis excludes that one hypothesises that p even 
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if one takes its negation to be the best way of answering Q. Yet, one might ask: “Why cannot 
you hypothesise that p if you don’t take p to be the answer to Q? More to the point: why 
cannot you hypothesise that p if your aim is to show that p is false and does not answer Q?”. 
I certainly acknowledge the existence of cases where entertaining a proposition we 
regard as false might be conducive to closing the question at issue. An even more interesting 
case is the one in which we entertain p with the aim of showing that p is false. A 
straightforward example is that of reductio arguments. Suppose we are inquiring into the 
question whether p is true, and we are cognitively inclined towards not-p. Thus, we 
hypothesise not-p. In a reductio argument, we start off with taking p to be true and then show 
that doing so, together with other seemingly plausible assumptions and rules of inference, 
leads to a contradiction. However, when we take p to be true at the first step of a reductio, we 
do not do so since we aim at closing the inquiry into p’s truth-value in the affirmative; quite 
the opposite! Crucially, when one entertains a proposition at the first step of a reductio 
argument, one does so exactly because one thinks (and perhaps has reasons to think) that there 
are reasons in favour of its negation. So, I submit that the mental state we are in while being at 
the first step of a reductio is a functionally different state from what I have been calling 
‘hypothesis’. We might instead say that we suppose a proposition for reductio. Thus, on my 
view, the inquirer who takes a given question to be open can both suppose not-p for reductio 
purposes while, at the same time, hypothesising that p. This strikes me as a plausible and 
natural consequence of the view on offer. 
Finally, let me comment on an alternative way of spelling out the functional profile of 
the doxastic attitude of cognitive inclination we entertain at the second stage of inquiry by 




S endorses p in a research domain d only if: 
1. S is disposed to assert that p, or otherwise express commitment to p (in d). 
2. S takes herself to be obligated to defend p (in d). 
3. S treats p as a premise in her further reasoning (in d). 
4. S shapes her research program in d (in part) based on p. 
5. S is resiliently committed to p (in d). 
6. S takes p to be a live option (i.e., she does not know p is false). 
7. In endorsing p, S aims to promote healthy inquiry. 
 
There are several similarities and dissimilarities between my hypothesis and Fleisher’s 
endorsement which would deserve to be examined carefully. For the time being, however, I 
will rest content with emphasising what I take to be the major difference between hypothesis 
and endorsement. Endorsement is explicitly restricted to propositions one entertains in 
research domains. Indeed, one of the necessary conditions for endorsing p is that one shape 
one’s research program in a domain (in part) based on p. By contrast, I take it that one can be 
at the second stage of inquiry irrespective of whether one is pursuing a given theoretical 
program in a research domain. Recall the inquiring into the author and title of a philosophy 
article example offered in the introduction, in which I am trying to find a paper about 
normative requirements I only vaguely recall. I might clearly hypothesise that it’s got 
“normative” in the title and its author is John Broome and start inquiring into this accordingly. 
Unless we end up constructing research domains and programs in a very liberal – and rather 
implausible – way, it follows that Fleisher’s endorsement cannot be an account of the state of 
mind I am in when I am inclined towards taking the proposition that John Broome is the 
author of a given article on normative requirements to be the answer to my normativity article 
question. So, my characterisation of hypothesis does seem to be wide enough as to make 
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sense of the vast array of cases in which we are cognitively inclined towards a given answer 
to a question. 
Summing up the discussion pursued so far: 
 
Suspended judgement: Question-directed attitude of epistemic neutrality. It involves 
inquisitive dispositions, and it’s typically associated with the first 
stage of inquiry. 
Belief:  Propositional attitude. It involves a disposition to unqualifiedly 
assert the entertained proposition and to use it unrestrictedly in 
theoretical and practical reasoning. Its function is to be true, and 
it’s typically associated with the ending stage of inquiry at which 
we settle on a given answer to a question. 
Hypothesis:   Propositional attitude of cognitive inclination. It involves focused 
inquisitive dispositions, a disposition to conjecture the relevant 
proposition and to use it restrictedly in inquisitive theoretical and 
practical reasoning. Its function is to enable us to pursue our 
inquiries by focusing on a specific way to answer a question, and 
it’s typically associated with the second stage of inquiry. 
 
3 The normative profile of hypothesis 
 
This section takes up the question of what the normative profile of hypothesis is. A normative 
profile is to be understood minimally as issuing a set of prescriptive standards. This 
minimalism is all for the good, allowing us to find common ground between those theorists 
holding that we should type-individuate doxastic attitudes exclusively on functional grounds, 
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and those theorists maintaining that type-individuation of doxastic attitudes depends solely on 
the specification of their constitutive norms (see McHugh and Whiting 2014 for an overview 
and further references). The delicate question of how we should type-individuate doxastic 
attitudes is orthogonal to the project I am after in this paper, for the existence of a doxastic 
attitude of cognitive inclination should be acknowledged irrespective of whether we are 
functionalists or normativists about doxastic attitudes. So, I invite exclusive functionalists to 
take the discussion that follows as bringing out a set of regulative norms for hypothesis that 
do not help determine its essence which, according to their taste, will have to be regarded as 
fully spelled out by my previous observations about its functional profile. I also invite 
exclusive normativists to regard my discussion of the norm of hypothesis that will follow 
momentarily as revealing what’s constitutively distinctive about such an attitude. Finally, I 
invite those sympathetic to a third way approach to type-individuation to the effect that norms 
type-individuate different attitudes together with their content and functional profiles to think 
of the normative profile of hypothesis as established by looking at the aim or function of such 
an attitude and as partly individuating of it. 
Having clarified this, let me start off with tackling the question of the normative profile 
of hypothesis by focusing on the relation between knowledge and inquiry. Friedman (2017: 
312) observes that “inquiring while knowing is somehow epistemically impermissible or 
inappropriate”. She then subscribes to what I shall call the Requirement Not to Inquire while 
Knowing Principle saying that if one knows that p answers Q at t,13 then one ought not be in 
an inquiring state of mind towards Q at t. To abbreviate it formally: 
 
RNIK: Kp →  O¬Ip. 																																																								
13 Friedman (2017: 311) calls it “Ignorance Norm”. Throughout the paper, I will take the ‘p answers Q’ 
expression to refer to p being a complete answer to Q. 
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On reflection, though, RNIK is too strong. When one knows the answer to a question, one is 
clearly epistemically permitted to no longer inquire into that question, in that knowledge is, 
undoubtedly, an epistemically valuable state to reach while inquiring into some matter. This, 
however, is altogether compatible with the pursuit of a Cartesian-sounding infallibilist 
inquisitive project wherein one does not bring the inquiry into a question to a close unless one 
reaches objective certainty about the matter at issue. Surely, given the prominence of the 
fallibilist framework in epistemology, inquirers are under no epistemic obligation to pursue 
infallibilist projects. However, from RNIK it follows that inquirers are under the obligation not 
to pursue such projects. Yet, such an epistemic ban on infallibilist projects strikes me as 
unprincipled: from the fact that one is not required to do something it doesn’t follow that one 
is required not to do it.14 Thus, I propose to characterise the central relation between 
																																																								
14 One might wonder whether Friedman takes RNIK to be a wide-scope, as opposed to a narrow-scope, principle. 
If so, the epistemic obligation not to inquire takes scope over the whole conditional and the consequent cannot be 
“detached”, thereby avoiding the objection to RNIK I have just stated. Two observations are in order. First, 
Friedman (2017: 323 fn. 19) explicitly says that the principle receives a narrow-scope reading, but that a wide-
scope one is also acceptable. So, I do not take myself to be begging the question against her formulation of the 
principle. Secondly, and more importantly, I think that we should resist formulating RNIK (and cognate 
principles) as wide-scope norms. Wide-scope norms are widely (although not universally) taken to express 
requirements of rationality, where such requirements are meant to target certain ways of structuring one’s mind 
by preventing certain combinations of attitudes. Friedman (2017: 311-2) seems to be thinking of RNIK in these 
terms. However, RNIK crucially differs from run-of-the-mill rational requirements – consider the idea rationality 
requires of you that if you believe p, you do not believe not-p – in that it does not merely prevent certain 
combinations of attitudes. Irrespective of whether RNIK is formulated in a wide- or narrow-scope way, the 
antecedent of RNIK is a known proposition, and not a merely believed one. This asymmetry cannot be ignored 
and, to my mind, suggests that principles such as RNIK are to be seen as substantive prescriptions of reason, as 
opposed to structural prescriptions of rationality. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this matter. 
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knowledge and the states of mind we are in while inquiring into some matter via the following 
Permission Not to Inquire while Knowing Principle: 
 
PNIK: Kp →  P¬Ip. 
 
PNIK is an admittedly weak principle. One might even contest that since PNIK does not tell us 
when we are epistemically required to inquire into some matter, it is a rather unhelpful 
principle. I disagree. For one thing, I doubt that an answer to the question of when we are 
epistemically required to inquire into some matter is easily available. To bring out the 
complexity of the issue at hand, let us accept the widespread idea that knowledge is the aim of 
inquiry. Clearly, we cannot simply say that we are epistemically required to inquire into all 
the questions to which we do not know the answer, for that would lead us straight into 
requiring us to know a lot of uninteresting and insignificant truths, thereby raising traditional 
philosophical eyebrows about the value of knowledge. As I see it, the question of whether or 
not we are epistemically required to inquire into some matters rather than others gets as deep 
and delicate as the question of what the sources of epistemic normativity are. Hence, just like 
epistemic norms might in the end be grounded into something which is not distinctively 
epistemic, there might be no distinctively epistemic – as opposed to, say, practical – 
requirement to investigate into some matter. To my mind, PNIK should not take a beating for 
being silent on this issue. For another, PNIK’s weakness should not be confused with 
uninformativeness. The principle does tell us something about the relation between 
knowledge and inquiry, in that it tells us that if you ought to be in an inquiring state of mind 
towards Q, then you don’t know the answer to Q.15 This places a constraint on the normative 																																																								
15 To see why, let us assume PNIK. By contraposition, standard definition of P as ¬O¬, and double-negation 
elimination, we have: Op → ¬Kp. 
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profile of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter to which I will 
come back below. 
Mindful of PNIK, let us approach the question of the normative profile of hypothesis by 
briefly looking at when one is rationally permitted to suspend judgement and believe. Since 
suspended judgement’s aim is to the direct the mind towards a given question to be inquired 
into, and since Friedman (2017: 321) notices that there is nothing wrong with starting an 
inquiry into Q just out of curiosity, for pragmatic or moral reasons, we can say that one is 
epistemically permitted to suspend judgement in a wide range of circumstances. Let us turn 
now to belief and consider the following: 
 
B: For all p, one is permitted to believe that p if and only if p. 
 
As is well-known, B is far from uncontroversial.16 Yet, since it is one of the plausible ways 
whereby the normative profile of belief has been cashed out in the literature, I will use it for 
the sake of illustrating the normative profile of hypothesis by contrasting it with that of 
suspended judgement and belief. I submit that permissible hypothesis is governed by the 
following norm: 
 
H: For all p, one is permitted to hypothesise that p if and only if entertaining p enables one 
to make reliable progress with the inquiry into p being the answer to Q. 																																																								
16 See e.g. Whiting (2010) for a defence. Some of the complexities I will gloss over are: First, some would 
contend that the best formulation of B is in terms of an obligation rather than a permission. Secondly, while I am 
using truth as the relevant normative property, B could be reformulated in terms of knowledge (see e.g. 
Williamson 2000) without affecting the main points of the present discussion. Thirdly, we can make B 
compatible with an evidentialist view to the effect that it is epistemically appropriate to rely on evidential 
considerations when engaged in doxastic deliberation (See e.g. Shah and Velleman 2005). 
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The right-to-left side of H says that if entertaining p enables us to make reliable progress with 
the inquiry into p being the answer to Q, we may hypothesise p. The left-to-right side of H 
says that if entertaining p as true is not conducive to making reliable progress into 
discovering whether or not p is the answer to Q, then we ought not to hypothesise p. 
A couple of preliminary clarifications are in order. First, H does not require that one 
believe that progress will be made. Hence, if somebody thinks that no progress toward the 
truth of a given question – say, the question of whether or not there is free will – can ever be 
made but is still cognitively inclined towards compatibilism is not ipso facto an irrational 
hypothesiser. Conversely, it is not enough to believe that entertaining p will bring about 
(reliable) progress with the inquiry into p’s being the answer to Q in order for one to be a 
rational hypothesiser. Secondly, imposing the condition that the progress be reliable is meant 
to rule as irrational those inquirers who make progress with the inquiry into p being the 
answer to Q by sheer luck through motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and similarly 
vicious reasoning methods. The rough idea here is that while abduction, deduction, induction 
are reliable reasoning methods, motivated reasoning and confirmation bias are not. For 
present purposes I do not have to work out exactly why this is so. Thus, in order to fully 
specify the content of H one should feed into it one’s favourite way of tracing the distinction 
between reliable and unreliable reasoning methods and expect that it return the intuitively 
correct verdicts about the impermissibility of hypothesising in the aforementioned vicious 
cases. 
I have so far operated under the assumption that H is a squarely epistemic norm. This, 
however, can’t be assumed without argument. So, let me say something by way of defence of 
the epistemic nature of H. 
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H is a squarely epistemic norm even if making reliable progress with the inquiry into p 
being the answer to Q is not a reliable indicator/evidence of, nor is it a necessary condition 
for, nor makes it more accurate that p is the answer to Q. This means that rational hypothesis, 
unlike rational belief (see B), is not constrained by truth. However, rational hypothesis does 
promote truth (and knowledge) in the long run in a variety of ways. To illustrate, take Lucy’s 
case again: by hypothesising pf, she starts designing experiments whose goal is to test pf (as 
opposed to other candidate answers to FQ), she starts checking the coherence of pf with other 
established truths in biology, and so on. If the new experiments decisively speak against pf 
and such data can’t be easily explained away, and if pf is inconsistent with one of the 
uncontested truths of cell biology, this strongly suggests that pf does not answer FQ. Hence, 
the fact that Lucy has hypothesised pf has been conducive to the goal of minimising falsehood 
and error. 
To systematise these considerations, let us avail ourselves of the helpful distinction 
made by Fleisher (2018) between intrinsic and extrinsic epistemic reasons (or values) (See 
also Steel 2010). The basic idea is that epistemic reasons are intrinsic only if they are 
necessary for, or reliable indicators/evidence of truth. Hence, adopting B, p’s truth gives one 
an intrinsic epistemic reason to believe it. By contrast, epistemic reasons are extrinsic if they 
promote truth (and knowledge) without bearing any tight, be it evidential, probabilistic, 
causal, necessary, or what have you, link to truth or knowledge. H can therefore be seen as 
telling us which extrinsic epistemic considerations make one rationally permitted to 
hypothesise p. 
Importantly, H returns the desirable verdict about what Fleisher (2018) calls “sandwich 
reasons” to the effect that pragmatic reasons aimed at epistemic ends are not genuinely 
epistemic. Here is the case Fleisher has in mind. Suppose that eating a sandwich promotes 
truth in the long run in that it leads to better intellectual performance. Suppose that if Lucy 
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hypothesises pf she’ll end up working in a lab near a good sandwich shop. Does Lucy have an 
epistemic reason to hypothesise pf? Intuitively, the question should be answered in the 
negative. Fleisher (2018) suggests that extrinsic epistemic reasons are internal to domains of 
inquiry, and each domain of inquiry imposes its own standards for promoting epistemic ends. 
Hence, in the sandwich scenario Lucy does not count as having an extrinsic epistemic reason 
to hypothesise pf since eating sandwiches to improve one’s cognitive performance is not one 
of the standards of inquiry for attaining biological truth and knowledge. By contrast, testing 
one’s hypothesis against experimental data, as well as checking its coherence with well-
established truths in that domain can be plausibly seen as standards of inquiry within biology. 
H happily takes on board Fleisher’s distinction between extrinsic epistemic reasons and 
pragmatic reasons, in that regarding pf as true amounts to a permissible hypothesis only if 
doing so brings about progress with the inquiry into pf being the answer Q. So, the reasons 
that make one’s hypothesis that p permissible are inquiry-relative. 
I would like now to delve a little more into the content of H by focusing on the 
requirement of making progress with the inquiry (let’s forget about the reliability condition, 
since it won’t be relevant to what follows). One might wonder: “Why is one not permitted to 
hypothesise p in an inquiry in which one is a position to know that, given the available 
information, progress will never be made?”. 
To address this issue, it might help having in mind an example of an inquiry into a 
question about which we know that progress will never be made. Suppose you focus on 
Cantor’s continuum hypothesis by asking the following: assuming the standard Zermelo-
Fraenkel axiomatization of set theory (plus the axiom of choice, call this ZFC), is there an 
infinite set of real numbers which could not be put into one-to-one correspondence with either 
the integers or the real numbers? As is well-known, the independence results proved by 
Cohen and Gödel show that we can’t answer this question on the basis of ZFC axioms. So, we 
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are now in a position to know that we cannot make any progress – understood in terms of 
coming up with a yes/no answer – into the question of whether or not the continuum 
hypothesis holds within ZFC. Suppose that we keep on inquiring into this question and one 
tells us: ‘You should stop focusing on whether the continuum hypothesis is true within ZFC, 
you know that there’s no way of proving that!’. This ascription of blame seems perfectly 
legitimate. The necessary condition on permissible hypothesis imposed by H captures this 
verdict. 
On closer inspection, the legitimacy of such ascription of blame can be theoretically 
supported by a principle linking the permissibility of inquiry to the notion of being in a 
position to know.17 First, recall that in defending PNIK I have deployed the idea that 
knowledge is a valuable epistemic good to attain while inquiring into some matter. That is, if 
one gets to know the answer to a question, one can rationally take one’s inquiry into that 
question as satisfied and move on. Now, if PNIK tells you that you are rationally permitted to 
stop inquiring into Q if you know that p answers Q, this means that it might be possible for 
you to achieve knowledge of the answer to Q, e.g. p or not-p, in the first place. So, the 
following principles, call them Permission to Inquire and Possibility of Being in a Position to 
Know Principles, hold (let “k” be the being in a position to know operator): 
 
PIPK1: PIp → ◊kp.  
PIPK2: PI¬p → ◊k¬p. 
 
																																																								
17 Being in a position to know p and knowing p differ in that the condition that one believe p in the latter is 
replaced by the condition that one be physically and psychologically capable of believing p in the former (see 
Williamson 2000). It follows that being in a position to know, just like knowing, is factive. 
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With these two principles in place, we can show that the claim that one is permitted to inquire 
into the question of the truth-value of a proposition and the claim that one is in a position to 
know that one cannot be in a position to know that the proposition cannot be held together. 
The argument goes as follows: 
 
(1) k ¬ kp    (Ass) 
(2) k ¬ k¬p    (Ass) 
(3) PIp ∨ PI¬p   (Ass) 
(4) PIp     (Ass) 
(5)  ¬ kp    (1, factivity of k) 
(6) ¬ ¬ kp    (4, PIPK1, definition of ◊, and MP) 
(7) PI¬p    (3, 5, 6, RAA) 
(8)  ¬ k¬p    (2, factivity of k)  
(9) ¬ ¬ k¬p    (7, PIPK2, definition of ◊, and MP) 
(10) ⊥     (8, 9) 
(11) ¬ (PIp ∨ PI¬p)   (3, 10, RAA) 
 
This strengthens the contention that hypothesising that p in a permissible way requires that 
regarding p as true enable one to make progress with the inquiry into p’s being the answer to 
Q. 
At this stage, though, a natural question arises: “If one is not permitted to hypothesise in 
such cases, what’s the correct thing to do?”. Let me gesture towards what I take to be the right 
answer. The stance we are permitted to take towards a question such as whether or not the 
continuum hypothesis holds within ZFC is an attitude of neutrality standing for the epistemic 
inability of closing the question in the affirmative or negative way. Rosenkranz (2007) offers 
a characterisation of this kind of epistemic neutrality he dubs “True Agnosticism”. True 
Agnosticism is the stance we adopt when we are not in a position to know the truth-value of a 
proposition and will continue not to know it relative to all states of information we can reach 
	 29	
by expanding current methods of inquiry and cognitive powers. It is an interesting question 
how the agnostic stance described by Rosenkranz and the attitude of suspended judgement 
described by Friedman relate to one another. Such a question would deserve a careful 
examination that is better postponed to a separate investigation. However, the following 
seems plausible: epistemic neutrality comes in two varieties. We can have both an open-
minded, as it were, attitude of epistemic neutrality which is captured by Friedman’s suspended 
judgement; and a closed-minded, as it were, attitude of epistemic neutrality which is captured 
by Rosenkranz’s agnostic stance. The important point, to my mind, is that Rosenkranz’s 
agnosticism is a stance we adopt to close inquiries into certain questions in an epistemically 
neutral way, whereas Friedman’s suspended judgement is the attitude we hold to open 
inquiries. 
Summing up: sections 2 and 3 jointly support the conclusion that suspended judgement 
and belief are not of the right functional and normative currency to be entailed by or identical 
to hypothesis. I have accordingly characterised hypothesis by distinguishing it, both 
functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement and belief. However, one might ask: 
“Can’t hypothesis be reduced to other familiar doxastic attitudes than (full) belief, suspended 
judgement, or supposition?”. The next section addresses this question. 
 
4 Hypothesis as a sui generis doxastic attitude 
 
In this section I will look at three possible ways of reducing hypothesis to other doxastic 
attitudes and raise problems for each of them. This, together with the previous 
characterisation of the functional and normative profile of hypothesis, should lead us to 
conclude that hypothesis is a distinctive type of doxastic attitude. 
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Let me start off with the idea that since hypothesising that p stands for a more tentative 
cognitive attitude towards p than fully believing that p, we can take hypothesis to reduce to 
holding a certain credence, or set of credences, in p.18 Attractive though it might be, I believe 
that this view should be resisted, for two different kinds of considerations. The first kind is a 
collection of worries one has to face while characterising the relation between outright belief 
and credences and holding, at the same time, that the attitude of hypothesis reduces to 
credences. The second kind relies on the idea that credences can be attitudes whereby we 
close our inquiries. 
As is well-known, there is much debate on how outright belief and partial belief are 
related to one another. So, in order to properly evaluate the prospects of reducing hypothesis 
to credences, we should also consider how such a reductionist view interacts with the various 
positions one might take vis-à-vis the relation between full and partial belief. A careful 
assessment of the various positions advanced in this debate cannot be pursued here, so I will 
restrict my attention to what are, arguably, the two main competitors; (1) the nonreductionist 
pluralist approach defending the psychological and epistemological legitimacy of both 
outright and partial belief; (2) The reductionist approach to the effect that the former reduces 
to the latter.  
Let us take (1) first. The nonreductionist pluralist who would seek to reduce the attitude 
of hypothesis has to answer the question: which credences? The pluralist had better not take 
the whole [0, 1] interval as the reductive base. It is indeed important to bear in mind that what 
is distinctive of the attitude of hypothesis is that it stands for the individual’s taking p to be 
the most promising answer to Q. Yet, it is implausible to maintain that a very weak partial 
																																																								
18 My considerations against the credal reductionist approach are meant to hold for both mushy and sharp 
options. 
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belief, e.g. .1 credence in p, captures the qualitative aspect of being inclined to p qua the way 
of closing the inquiry into Q.  
To fix this wrinkle, the pluralist can maintain that hypothesis is to be reduced to a 
suitably defined set of high credences. At this point, however, the pluralist has to answer two 
questions concerning the way the reduction is actually carried out. The first is to specify the 
reductive base in a non-arbitrary way. The second is to explain what the cognitive role of low 
and middle credences is, given that – within the pluralist nonreductionist framework under 
scrutiny – they do not serve as candidate reductions for attitudes of disbelief and suspended 
judgement. This cognitive gap needs to be filled, and it is not obvious how the pluralist is 
going to do that. 
Let us turn now to the reductionist option and consider a proposal in accordance with 
the so-called Lockean Thesis.19 The Lockean Thesis offers a threshold-based reductionist 
approach to (rational) outright belief. First, the Lockean takes the whole [0, 1] interval to be 
the reductive base for the classical tripartite distinction between disbelief, suspended 
judgement, and belief. Secondly, the Lockean maintains that full belief is identical to 
sufficiently strong (but not necessarily 1) credence, and disbelief is identical to sufficiently 
weak (but not necessarily 0) credence. Now, since having low credence in p is guaranteed to 
be the equivalent to having high credence in not-p, and disbelieving p will be the same as 
believing not-p, we could just add a section for hypothesising on both sides of suspension, 
one for hypothesising p and another for hypothesising not-p.  On the face of it, then, the 
Lockean-reductionist could make descriptive sense of the attitude of hypothesis. Yet, it must 
be flagged that Lockean-reductionism is far from conclusively established. So, reducing the 
attitude of hypothesis to credences carries a far from ecumenical commitment to Lockean-
reductionism. 																																																								
19 See Christensen (2004), Foley (1993), Sturgeon (2008). 
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That being said, though, I believe that we also have epistemological – as opposed to 
merely psychological – reasons not to reduce the attitude of hypothesis to credences. The key 
epistemological consideration here is that credences can be (and sometimes are) attitudes 
whereby we close inquiries and can constitute knowledge. 
Let me firstly introduce this idea on intuitive grounds. Suppose one opens the question 
of whether Alice is eating cheese for lunch. If one has taken into account the total body of 
evidence bearing on the question, the evidence is such that there’s a 70% chance that Alice is 
eating cheese for lunch, and one’s credence in the proposition that Alice is eating cheese for 
lunch matches that chance, then it seems that – relative to that body of evidence – one is 
permitted to stop inquiring into the question by being .7 confident in the truth of the 
proposition that Alice is eating cheese for lunch. This suggests that the very idea of closing 
one’s inquiry into a question need not be factive. Rather, one closes one’s inquiry relative to 
one’s own epistemic position: if one’s body of evidence is such that – defeasibly and perhaps 
misleadingly – it tells that there’s a 70% chance that Alice is eating cheese for lunch, it seems 
that one can close one’s inquiry into the question of what Alice is eating for lunch by being .7 
confident that she’s eating cheese. Should one acquire new countervailing evidence, one (if 
rational) would re-open the question, weigh in the new evidence, and revise one’s credence 
accordingly (if needed). 
To sharpen this point, let us avail ourselves of the idea that even if credences can’t be 
true or false, they can be more or less close to the truth. That is, they can be more or less 
accurate. We can calculate the accuracy of credences via a scoring rule, namely a formula that 
enables us to calculate the accuracy of a credence in p by measuring how far it is from the 
truth-value p would have in the actual world w. More precisely, for any proposition p, 
credence Cr, and truth-value v, a scoring rule assigns a real number ≥ 0 which measures the 
accuracy of holding Cr when the truth-value of p in w is as given in v. Now, when one is not 
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sure about whether a given p is true, one can derive the expected accuracy of one’s credence 
relative to one’s probability function. The expected accuracy of a credence is the average of 
the accuracy scores the credence would get in cases where p is true and in cases where it is 
false, weighted by the probability that the state of the world in which p is true and the state of 
the world in which p is false obtain. 
Let us now consider the following principle, clearly identified for the first time by 
Sophie Horowitz (2014: 43): 
 
Immodesty: The credences recommended by your own epistemic rule, given a body 
of evidence, should uniquely maximise expected accuracy for you. 
 
Horowitz defends Immodesty in its full generality. Her main idea is that it would be irrational 
to regard some epistemic rule, namely a function from a body of evidence to doxastic states 
which the agent takes to be truth-conducive, as more truth-conducive than one’s own, but not 
adopt it. Immodesty is frequently appealed to by Bayesians. Joyce (1998) maintains that if 
you have coherent credences then you will be immodest. Greaves and Wallace (2006) use 
something like Immodesty to argue that conditionalisation maximises expected accuracy. 
Hence, Immodesty is a widely held principle. 
Now, in light of Immodesty, we can reason as follows: if you should regard your 
credence in p as maximising expected accuracy, then you are rationally permitted to take the 
question whether p to be settled. The driving thought behind this is that given that our 
epistemic position seldom affords us certainty about whether a given p is true, it seems that 
having credences which maximise expected accuracy is a good thing. Actually, that’s as 
rational as we will get insofar as we are trying to match our credences to how things are in the 
world relative to our own epistemic position. Hence, when one’s credence in p maximises 
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expected accuracy, one is rationally permitted to take the question whether p to be settled by 
being .n confident that p is the case. 
The foregoing observations show that we can rationally close our inquiries into the 
question of p’s truth-value by holding a certain credence in p’s truth. A fortiori, we can close 
our inquiries into p’s truth-value by holding credences. Moreover, the idea that we can close 
inquiries via credences receives independent support from the contention, recently defended 
by Konek (2016) and Moss (2013) (2018), that credences can constitute knowledge just like 
outright belief. If this is right, and if we plausibly maintain that knowing the answer to a 
question is a way of closing the inquiry into it, then we have additional reason to believe that 
credences are attitudes whereby we close inquiries. 
I regard the foregoing considerations as raising the following challenge: if one wanted 
to maintain that credences are attitudes we can entertain both when the inquiry is open and 
when it is closed, what does it make the case that they can play such a double-duty, given that 
such duties, as it were, have significant functional and normative differences? Which 
credences do we (and are appropriate to) have at the second stage? And which ones are 
compatible with knowledge and closing the inquiry? Insofar as we do not get a principled 
answer to these questions, I think that we have a prima facie reason to avoid reducing 
hypothesis to credences. 
I have raised some challenges against the credence-based reductionist approach to 
hypothesis which add up, it seems to me, to a cumulative argument against such a reductionist 
strategy. Let us turn now to a metacognitive reductionist strategy maintaining that the attitude 
held at the second stage of inquiry reduces to some belief about the epistemic status of p. 
Potential candidates are: the belief that p has so far more justification than r has; the belief 
that p is more likely to be true than r; the belief that the evidence supports p more than r. I 
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submit that such an approach is vulnerable to counterexamples.20 I will construct one such 
counterexample by focusing on the idea that hypothesis entails the belief that p has so far 
more justification than r has, but the pattern of counterexample carries over to the other 
potential candidates listed above. 
Let us consider inquisitive enterprises featuring hyperintellectualised inquirers. A 
hyperintellectualised inquirer is somebody who hypothesises that p, is aware of why she’s 
doing so, and holds certain views about what justification is such that they exclude that she is 
hypothesising that p since she takes p to have so far more justification than r. For instance, 
one can take p to be the way to answer Q since that answer to Q fits better with other answers 
one gives to related questions T, V, Z. Moreover, one is also aware that one believes that 
coherence is not a justification-conferring property. In this case, the fact that one takes p to be 
the most promising way to answer Q does not entail that one believes that p is more justified 
than r. This would not amount to taking p more justified than r is, for one does not subscribe 
to a coherentist theory of justification. 
Cases of hyperintellectualised inquirers are such that one hypothesises that p without 
committing oneself to any stance about p’s epistemic pedigree. Such cases seem possible. 
Hence, being at the second stage of inquiry does not entail having a belief about the epistemic 
status of the answer we are cognitively inclined towards. 
Finally, one might think that the attitude of hypothesis reduces to what many 
philosophers call “acceptance”. Yet, different philosophers mean different things by 
“acceptance”. I will now consider three prominent accounts of acceptance and show that the 
attitude of hypothesis crucially differs from each of them. 
																																																								
20 Goldberg’s definition of what he calls “attitudinal speculation” is an instance of such metacognitive accounts 
(see Goldberg 2013: 283). 
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First, Cohen (1992) defines acceptance that p (call it C-acceptance) as having or 
adopting a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p, using p in practical and 
theoretical reasoning, independently of whether one “feels it to be true that p” (Cohen 1992: 
4). C-acceptance can’t be the attitude of hypothesis, though, for the latter comes with a 
cognitive inclination towards the entertained proposition whereas the former doesn’t, in that 
one can accept that p “whether or not one feels it to be true that p”. 
Secondly, Stalnaker (1984: 79-81) claims that to accept a proposition is to treat it as true 
and to ignore (for some reason and at least temporarily) that it is false (call this S-acceptance). 
In Stalnaker’s picture, “acceptance” is an umbrella term whereby we refer to all cognitive 
propositional attitudes, such as belief, supposition, imagination, and so on. Thus, when we 
believe p we thereby S-accepts p, when we imagine p we thereby S-accepts it, and so on.  
Thus, while S-acceptance is such that hypothesising p entails S-accepting it, this is a rather 
moot point in the context of the present discussion. 
Thirdly, Van Fraassen (1980: 12) speaks of acceptance (call it V-acceptance) of a 
scientific theory as involving both a belief that the theory is empirically adequate and a 
pragmatic commitment consisting, for the scientists, in the adoption of a particular research 
program, and for everyone, in the disposition to use the theory in giving explanations and 
answering questions ex cathedra. Even granting the non-trivial extension of the notion of V-
acceptance to any sort of proposition (and not just to a set of propositions constituting a 
scientific theory), V-acceptance and hypothesis crucially differ in two respects. First, the latter 
doesn’t entail a belief that the relevant proposition is empirically adequate. Secondly, and 
more importantly, V-acceptance is meant to play the role played by belief without carrying a 
commitment to the truth of the V-accepted proposition. Thus, V-acceptance has to be 
regarded as a way of closing the inquiry into a certain question via a proposition which differs 
from belief. Yet, as has emerged previously, hypothesis is the attitude we entertain when the 
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inquiry is still open. So, V-acceptance and hypothesis play two different roles in inquiry. 
In this section I have considered and raised objections to attempts at reducing 
hypothesis to more familiar types of doxastic attitudes, such as a credence (or set of 
credences) towards p, a belief about the epistemic status of p, an acceptance that p. This, 
together with the previously established point that hypothesis doesn’t reduce to suspended 
judgement or full belief, entitles us to conclude that hypothesis is a sui generis type of 
doxastic attitude. 
 
5 Summing Up 
 
The states of mind we are in while we are inquiring into some question are functionally 
characterised by a distinctive sensitivity to answering a question, to be understood in terms of 
dispositions to gather and assess information and evidence which are conducive to closing the 
target question. This functional role, I have argued, can be played in more than way, 
depending on whether one is at a stage of open inquiry in which one is merely in a 
doxastically neutral state of mind, or whether one is at a later stage of open inquiry in which 
one is cognitively inclined towards a given answer to a question. I take Friedman’s notion of 
suspended judgement to be an apt characterisation of the doxastic neutrality one exhibits at 
the first stage of inquiry, whereas I take my characterisation of hypothesis to make sense of 
the attitude of cognitive inclination one typically entertains at the second stage of inquiry. As 
far as I can see, both suspended judgement and hypothesis are types of doxastic attitudes 
which can respect the normative connection between knowing and being in an inquiring state 
of mind expressed via PNIK, which reads as follows: Kp →  P¬Ip. The view of the inquiring 
states of mind just presented allows a straightforward derivation of PNIK by entailment from 
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the following Permission not to Suspend Judgement while Knowing Principle and Permission 
not to Hypothesise while Knowing Principle: 
 
PSK: Kp →  P¬SQ. 
PHK: Kp →  P¬Hp. 
 
The justification for both principles hinges on the contention – already deployed above to 
justify PNIK, PIPK1, PIPK2 – that knowledge is a valuable epistemic condition to reach while 
inquiring into some matter. If one knows that p (namely, if one knows that p answers Q), then 
one is certainly no longer required to inquire into Q. 
This completes my account of the doxastic attitudes we entertain at open stages of 
inquiry. However, the foregoing discussion naturally prompts the following questions: “Why 
suspend judging? And why hypothesise?”. Here I mean to be raising the question of the 
epistemological import of these two attitudes and of the different stages of inquiry. Since 
suspended judgement enables us to be epistemically neutral about the question we set out 
investigate, it seems that we are (epistemically) right in being suspended whenever we open 
the inquiry into some matter and we don’t have any clue as to how to address it. Friedman 
elaborates at length on this thought, so I won’t dwell on suspended judgement any further. I 
will rather offer some considerations on the epistemological significance of hypothesis. 
 
6 The epistemological significance of hypothesis 
 
I will suggest that holding an attitude of hypothesis is the rational thing to do while facing a 
disagreement with an acknowledged epistemic peer. Furthermore, the appeal to hypothesis 
offers a suitable development of the idea – originally defended by Philip Kitcher (see e.g. 
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Kitcher 1993) – that some of our inquisitive enterprises are such that they would benefit 
epistemically from avoidance of consensus and promotion of cognitive diversity across 
inquirers. 
To begin with, let me emphasise that if the arguments of this paper are sound, we should 
acknowledge the existence of a new variety doxastic revision: one can revise one’s belief that 
p by turning it into an attitude of hypothesis towards p. I believe that this new variety of 
doxastic revision provides us with a new and promising solution to the problem of peer 
disagreement. Let me explain. 
So-called conciliatory views of peer disagreement maintain that, upon discovering a 
disagreement with an epistemic peer, one ought to revise one’s doxastic state either by 
suspending judgement or by adjusting one’s degree of confidence in light of one’s peer’s take 
on the matter at stake. By contrast, so-called steadfast views claim that one should not revise 
one’s belief and is epistemically entitled to stick to one’s guns. As is well-known, however, 
conciliatory views have to face the objection of providing a sceptical response to the 
discovery of peer disagreement, while steadfast views have to face the opposite charge of 
providing a dogmatic way of responding to peer disagreement.21 
The respective sceptical and dogmatic drifts have led many supporters of conciliatory 
and steadfast views to engage into a process of refinement and amendment of their respective 
views which, as of today, has not yielded a clear – let alone conclusive – verdict about which 
view is the correct one. I therefore suggest exploring the prospects for a new view saying that 
peers are rational in responding to their disagreement by turning their initial doxastic attitudes 
																																																								
21 There’s an impressive body of literature on peer disagreement (see e.g. the Christensen and Lackey 2013 and 
Feldman and Warfield 2010 collections). 
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towards p and not-p into attitudes of hypothesis towards them.22 Let me now highlight three 
important features of this view. 
First, the view enables us to capture the conciliatory intuition that peer disagreement is 
somehow epistemically significant, for it makes room for some doxastic revision. 
Importantly, the intuition is preserved without giving rise to a sceptical response to peer 
disagreement, in that hypothesis and suspended judgement are different doxastic attitudes. 
Secondly, and relatedly, the idea that two peers are rational in revising their initial 
cognitive states by turning them into contrasting hypotheses is compatible with the idea, 
defended – amongst others – by Christensen (2010) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), that the 
epistemic significance of disagreement lies in bringing forth the doubt that one’s doxastic 
attitude was never rational to begin with. Disagreement has the distinctive retrospective 
impact of being evidence that one’s belief was not epistemically supported at the time of its 
formation, in that it is evidence that one’s belief is the output of a flawed cognitive process 
(this kind of evidence goes under the name of “higher-order evidence”). On this 
understanding of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement, it is quite natural to claim 
that the peers are rational in being in an inquiring state of mind towards the relevant question 
by re-assessing what the original body of evidence is, how to interpret its probative force, and 
how to reason from the evidence to a belief. 																																																								
22 I fully develop this view in Palmira (2019). Similar views have been defended by Goldberg (2013) and Barnett 
(forthcoming) in connection to philosophical disagreement. Goldberg invokes the aforementioned notion of 
“attitudinal speculation” in order to make sense of the possibility that two philosophers rationally retain their 
incompatible philosophical views without retaining a belief in them. Barnett raises some worries about 
Goldberg’s metacognitive definition of attitudinal speculation and defends a view of the rational response to peer 
disagreement in philosophy to the effect that one is rationally permitted to have an attitude of “inclination to 
accept a certain view as true”. Since Barnett does not give us any detail about the functional and normative 
profile of this attitude, one might wonder whether what I call “hypothesis” is what he has in mind. 
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Thirdly, the view on offer retains some of the attractiveness of the steadfast intuition to 
the effect that a complete suspension of judgement would be epistemically spineless in many 
interesting and controversial cases, such as moral and philosophical disagreements. Revising 
by hypothesising enables the peers to retain their respective cognitive inclinations towards the 
truth and falsity of p which would be lost if they had to revise by suspending judgement and 
becoming open-mindedly neutral about the issue at stake. Since the attitude of hypothesis is 
held while taking the inquiry into a question to be open, this will enable peers to keep on 
inquiring into the matter they disagree about without giving up completely their respective 
views. Thus, the view I recommend vindicates the idea that two peers can rationally sustain 
their disagreement insofar as their doxastic attitudes towards p and its negation are 
hypotheses, as opposed to beliefs or credences. 
Let me turn now to the second suggestion about the epistemological significance of 
hypothesis. Philip Kitcher has famously argued that dividing cognitive labour amongst 
scientists can increase the chance of discovering a significant scientific truth. Suppose that 
theory T about question Q is 80% likely to be true whereas theory G is only 20% likely to be 
true (on the available evidence). Clearly, rational standards for individual belief are such that 
scientists should believe and pursue T while foregoing G. However, Kitcher shows that this is 
not the most truth-conducive thing to do collectively: T might well be false, and it is more 
conducive to discovering the truth about Q by letting a group of scientists work on T and a 
different group of scientists work on the less likely answer T’ to Q than by letting the entire 
scientific community pursuing T.23 																																																								
23 While Kitcher is focusing specifically on scientific inquiries, authors such as Barnett (forthcoming) and Elgin 
(2010) suggest generalising Kitcher’s point by looking at the structural features of various inquisitive scenarios 
in which fostering cognitive diversity has better epistemic payoffs than promoting consensus amongst inquirers. 
Noticeably, they take philosophical inquiry to be another domain in which Kitcher’s division of cognitive labour 
can be fruitful. 
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If we follow Kitcher here, the following problem arises. If – as argued above – beliefs 
and credences are attitudes whereby we bring inquiries to a close, these cannot be taken the 
attitudes whose diversity needs to be promoted, for cognitive diversity is meant to beneficial 
in the pursuit of truth when inquiries are still open. Relatedly, if inquirers pursue the less 
likely theory by believing it, they would be regarded as irrational, in that they should have 
believed the more likely theory. This leaves us with an unwelcome result: from an epistemic 
perspective inquirers would be collectively rational but individually irrational. 
Suspended judgement won’t do either: even if it is an attitude we can entertain while 
inquiring, it clearly fails to promote cognitive diversity. I therefore conjecture that the attitude 
hypothesis is the type of cognition that can be diversified while taking inquiries to be still 
open. That is to say, by entertaining different hypotheses about Q, inquirers can sincerely 
advocate and defend their different views on the matter they are investigating and bring about 
the epistemic benefits of cognitive diversity. Moreover, by hypothesising  – as opposed to 
believing – less likely candidate answers to given questions, inquirers would not count as 
epistemically irrational, in that permissible hypothesis is not governed by truth-constrained 





24 Fleisher (2018) argues for this point extensively while talking about endorsement. I submit that given that his 
considerations rely on there to be extrinsic epistemic reasons for endorsement, and given that the same reasons 
are the ones which make hypothesising rational, his point extends to hypothesis. Furthermore, given that 
hypothesising p is something we do irrespective of whether we are in a scientific research context, this 
guarantees that the gap between collective and individual rationality in the division of cognitive labour can be 




We can now bring our inquiry into the question of what doxastic attitudes we entertain while 
we inquire into some matter. I have defended that besides being doxastically neutral about a 
question, we have to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive type of attitude of cognitive 
inclination towards a given proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. 
Questions about the epistemological import of these two attitudes and of the different stages 
of inquiry can now be raised. The remarks I have offered in the last section provide some 
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